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On Value and Obligation in Practical Reason:  




“+is brings us to one of the most pointless controversies of modern moral 
philosophy, . . . How can we move from the descriptive to the normative, 
from fact to value, from Is to Ought?”1
Introduction
Hume’s is–ought2 gap is, in the +omistic moral tradition, regularly 
treated as being the same problem as the fact–value gap. +e transition 
between the two is routinely just as swi7 and little-noted as that which the 
Scot observed from “is” to “ought” in the ethical discourse of his own day.3
1   Ralph McInerny, Ethica !omistica, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Catholic University 
of America Press, 1997), 37.
2   David Hume, A Discourse of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), III, 
pt.1, no. 1: “In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, . . . the 
author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the 
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human a=airs; when of a sudden 
I am surpriz’d to @nd, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and 
is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought 
not. +is change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this 
ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or aBrmation, ‘tis necessary that . . 
. a reason should be given . . . how this new relation can be a deduction from others, 
which are entirely di=erent from it” (469).
3   +is identi@cation of the two problems is quite understandable insofar as awareness 
of the fact–value gap is generally traced to G. E. Moore’s attack on ethical natural-
ism in his Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), where 
he himself used his “open question” to challenge the intelligibility of evaluative 
statements in general, including normative statements; i.e., his challenge concerning 
evaluative statements includes the speci@c sort of moral value that is equivalent to 
“ought.”
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Further, these two dichotomies (fact–value and is–ought) are regularly 
treated as being identical, not only to one another, but also to Aristotle 
and Aquinas’s distinction between practical and speculative.4 And the 
question whether (and if so, how) practical (“ought” or normative) knowl-
edge is derived from speculative (“is” or descriptive) knowledge has driven 
some of the @ercest disputes among the schools of +omistic theorists of 
natural law.
I intend to show that both of these identi@cations are wrong and the 
debate has been misframed. +e is–ought gap is not the fact–value gap, 
and neither of them corresponds neatly to Aquinas’s distinction between 
the speculative and practical. ConKating value and obligation has resulted 
in an insoluble problem, but if, as I intend to show, they are both distinct in 
themselves and treated as such by Aquinas, then the possibility opens of a 
resolution—within the +omistic school—to a debate that has, heretofore, 
proven particularly resistant to consensus.
My treatment will proceed in four sections. I intend @rst to explain and 
defend the thesis that there is a fact–value gap: the bare understanding 
of speculative truth does not move an agent to act unless it @rst touches 
a desire or natural inclination. I will show that Aquinas is well aware of 
this gap and respects the distinction between purely factual knowledge 
and value in his moral psychology. Second, I intend to show that value and 
4   For example, McInerny, Ethica !omistica, 37, quoted as the epigraph of the 
present essay; see also 48–50. Steven A. Long, !e Teleological Grammar of the 
Moral Act, 2nd ed. (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2015), 72–76, provides a brilliant 
example. He begins speaking of Hume and the is–ought problem, swi7ly moves 
to a discussion of speculative knowledge of teleology and its relation to practical 
knowledge and desire, then speaks of the divide between “‘fact” and “value,” 
before returning to the relation between “ought” and “is,” all of this without any 
indication that these are distinct questions. See also John Finnis, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 37 (“Aquinas’s Aristotelian distinction 
between ‘speculative’ and practical reason corresponds so neatly with the modern 
. . . distinction which we . . . indicate by contrasting ‘fact’ and ‘norm’ or ‘is’ and 
‘ought’”), and in his subsequent treatment of Clarke (whom he contends Hume 
was originally critiquing in his famous no-is-from-ought passage), he conKates 
obligation with value or desire: “Clarke’s argument fails to make the transition 
from is . . . to ought because it fails to advert to any desire or interest of the agent’s 
that might be satis@ed by acting rightly. . . . It fails to consider whether acting 
@ttingly and reasonably is in any aspect of . . . the agent’s well-being or in any way 
worth while or desirable” (40–41). See also Steven Jensen, Knowing the Natural 
Law: From Precepts and Inclination to Deriving Oughts, (Washington, DC: Cath-
olic University of America Press, 2015), 1–2: “[David Hume] suggested that it is 
illegitimate to begin with a statement of fact about the way the world is and to 
conclude with a value, of what is good or of what should be.” 
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obligation are distinct concepts and therefore the fact–value gap is not 
the is–ought gap, although—as I will also show—the two are routinely 
conKated in the contemporary +omistic dispute over the relation of 
speculative to practical knowledge. In the third section, I intend to show 
that Aquinas clearly distinguishes between obligation and value, and 
in fact, he recognizes two clearly discrete forms of practical reason that 
answer to these two discrete notions, with each form of practical reason 
having its own distinct set of principles. Finally, I intend to show in the 
fourth section that, while conKating value and obligation led to an insol-
uble problem, conversely, once the notions of value and obligation are 
clearly distinguished, the is–ought gap poses no particular diBculty and 
the principal concerns of both sides in the debate can be answered. With 
these clari@cations made, I will suggest a detailed, if tentative, account of 
precisely how synderesis gives us our @rst awareness of moral law from a 
prior speculative understanding.
 !at !ere is a Fact–Value Gap
By “value” I mean to name such desire or care for a thing as is necessary for 
that thing to motivate deliberate activity. Value—considered as that which 
is psychologically suBcient to serve as a motive for action—is, at root, a 
function of appetite or inclination: to value something is to desire it.
Since “good” denotes the desirable, it is natural to use the language of 
goodness when discussing value, but because “good” is an analogous term, 
there is here a danger of confusion and equivocation, and as will become 
apparent, it is precisely averting such confusion that makes a discussion of 
the fact–value gap necessary. I readily admit that there are speculative or 
purely descriptive senses of “good” which are founded on our apprehension 
of a thing’s teleology. A thing can be called good in itself, for example, if 
it is complete in its kind and ful@lls its purpose or acts in a way conducive 
to its natural end; thus we might speak of a spider as good if it is healthy 
and demonstrates the characteristics and behaviors that are typical of its 
species. Similarly, one thing can be called good for another if it conduces 
or contributes to the other’s attaining its telos—thus we might say that 
it is good for the spider to eat the Ky. Nonetheless, I insist, such specula-
tive apprehensions of goodness, rooted in an understanding of teleology, 
cannot, of themselves, provide a motive for deliberate action and so do 
not constitute value in the relevant sense. To extend Alisdair MacIntyre’s 
example from A"er Virtue,5 knowing that a watch is a good watch, that it 
5   Alasdair MacIntyre, A"er Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1984), 57–58. See also Peter Geach, “Good and Evil,” Analysis 17 
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has what a watch ought to have given its purpose (it is portable, keeps time 
accurately, and is stylish), does not motivate me unless I already want or 
desire a watch in some respect (perhaps desiring to amend my chronically 
tardy life, or desiring to signal my Kawless taste to my peers). Likewise, just 
knowing that it is good for the spider to eat the Ky does not, of itself, give 
me a reason to care whether the spider actually gets the Ky, nor does the 
bare knowledge that this spider is an ideal specimen of its species provide 
me a motive for any particular action. In a similar way, a speculative 
account of human nature, including what makes a human a good human, 
does not move me to act unless I somehow desire to be a “good human,” 
and a speculative account of what constitute good human acts cannot 
motivate me to perform such acts unless I already desire to perform good 
human acts as such, that is, unless I desire to be virtuous. As Peter Geach 
himself readily concedes, “it ought to be clear that calling a thing a good A 
does not inKuence choice unless the one who is choosing happens to want 
an A.”6 Knowledge must touch desire before it can give rise to act, for an 
apprehension moves only through an appetite.
If my apprehension of some thing is to move me to act, I must expe-
rience a desire for that sort of thing. I must care about that sort of thing. 
Marshal whatever facts you like, but until those facts touch on a desire that 
I experience, those facts will not constitute, for me, a motive for action. 
Hence the sort of apprehension of good that moves an agent to act is not a 
purely speculative apprehension of good, but the good insofar as it actually 
corresponds to a value of the one it motivates and insofar as it thus touches 
a prior desire.
+is @rst distinction maps directly to a second fundamental distinc-
tion: namely, between an observed desire and an experienced desire.7 I 
(1956): 33–42, for an early use of descriptive good as a defense against ethical 
non-naturalism, e.g., 34: “‘Good’ like ‘bad’ is essentially an attributive adjective. . . . 
+ere is no such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad 
so-and-so.” As McInerny later explained the point, “the only way we can @gure out 
what is meant by calling someone a good philosopher is to go into what it is to be a 
philosopher” (Ethica !omistica, 51).
6   Geach, “Good and Evil,” 37. +us Geach himself accepted the fact–value gap, even 
as he sought a way around it to defend naturalism. +is admission from Geach 
ought, I think, to be an embarrassment to McInerny, who summarizes the fact–
value gap (“there is a gap between fact and value that cannot be closed by citing 
facts about the valued thing”) and ridiculed those who accept such a gap (“alas we 
know we are doing philosophy when we @nd ourselves in such a Wonderland as 
this”), while on the same page appealing to this very essay of Geach’s for “an e=ec-
tive countering of this dogma” (Ethica !omistica, 50). 
7   If this distinction should stand, it constitutes a rather serious challenge to Jensen, 
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can observe the behavior of an organism and come to understand that it 
has particular, natural inclinations which move it to act for the sake of 
various ends. But such observation of inclinations is altogether di=erent 
from actually experiencing desires for those ends. Observation of desire is 
apprehensive and belongs to the intellect; experience of desire is rooted in 
appetite. To experience a desire for a thing is ipso facto to care about it, and 
that, rather than mere observation of desire, is what allows it to serve as a 
motive for acting. To observe that something desires water is not the same 
as being thirsty; even to observe that one’s own nature “desires” water does 
not necessarily guarantee that one actually wants to drink. +is is why 
both contraception and periodic continence are intelligible: the agents 
experience a desire for acts per se apt for procreation, and they recognize 
that this act, which they explicitly desire, is in fact ordered by their biology 
to a further end which they do not explicitly desire. +us, although they 
observe a desire (in the sense of recognizing a teleological order) to repro-
duce, they do not experience a desire for that end considered in itself.
+e apprehension of good that corresponds to experienced desire is 
what can motivate an agent. +is is the sort of good that is relevant in the 
fact–value gap: no set of factual propositions can move me to act without 
there being some experienced desire that those facts somehow bear upon. 
Just as no facts about a watch make me want a watch unless those facts are 
brought into relation with some desire that I actually experience, so neither 
can speculative facts about my nature and its teleology move me to pursue 
an object unless they are brought to bear on a desire that I experience.8
Such observations @t perfectly with a number of things that Aquinas 
says about the practical intellect. Aquinas holds that “that for which 
there is an appetite, namely the desirable, is the principle of the practical 
intellect,”9 and he holds that the activity of prudence (which perfects prac-
tical reason10) always presupposes some appetite for the end: “Prudence 
who argues that we learn what is good for us by observing our natural inclinations, 
in the same way that we learn the natural inclinations, ends, and goods of other 
things by observing the teleology implicit in their behavior (Knowing the Natural 
Law, 79–80).
8   One may object that the @rst case di=ers from the latter in that there is no natural 
inclination to own a watch, whereas there are natural inclinations to those things 
that make one a good human. But that some desires are natural and inescapable, 
while certainly important to a complete theory of natural law, is irrelevant to the 
point I am making presently—namely, that speculative knowledge cannot move an 
agent to act without being joined to an experienced desire. 
9   In III de an., lec. 15, no. 4.
10   Summa theologiae [ST] II-II, q. 47, a. 2, corp.
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presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty 
is directed towards good.”11 We do not even deliberate about how to 
attain an end unless we @rst will that end.12 +us practical reason as it is 
informed by prudence, whose function is to arrange the means to the end, 
presupposes an actual appetite for the end, whereas, he speci@cally says, 
the speculative reason does not move us to act, because it says nothing of 
pursuit or Kight.13
Because practical reason begins with experienced desire—because it 
starts with something we already care about and value—the practical 
intellect can directly guide the will: it shares—so to speak—a common 
language with the will, the language of actual, experienced desire. Its judg-
ments about the means are always immediately and transparently related 
back to some end actually desired by the appetites; as Aquinas puts it, 
“since the desirable thing itself, which is the @rst thing considered by the 
practical intellect, moves, therefore the practical intellect is said to move, 
namely because its principle, which is desirable, moves,”14 or again, “if both 
intellect and appetition are principles with respect to one and the same 
movement they must, as such, share the same speci@c nature; since a single 
e=ect implies always a single cause of precisely that one e=ect.”15
 !at Obligation Is Not Derived from Value
In distinguishing the is—ought gap from the fact—value gap, I mean to 
say that moral obligation can be apprehended by an agent independently of 
any prior apprehension of desirability, and conversely that an apprehension 
of a thing’s desirability does not, of itself, entail an obligation to obtain that 
thing. A number of philosophers have suggested that the is–ought gap can 
be bridged through an entailment of “ought” by “wants”;16 consider expres-
11   ST I, q. 22, a. 1, ad 3.
12   In III de an., lec. 15, no. 4. 
13   In III de an., lec. 16, no. 10; In VI eth., lec. 2 and 12; In III de an., lec. 14, nos. 
19–20; In III de an., lec. 15, no. 3. Cf. ST I-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2.
14   In III de an., lec. 15, no. 4. 
15   In III de an., lec. 15, no. 7.
16   Alastair MacIntyre, “Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought,’” Philosophical Review 68 (1959): 
451–68, at 462–463; Max Black, “+e Gap Between ‘Is’ and ‘Should,’” Philosoph-
ical Review 73 (1964): 165–81. See also G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral 
Philosophy,” Philosophy 33 (1958): 1–19, at 5, 7, 15, and 18, and Geach, “Good 
and Evil,” 39: “By what logical step can we pass from the supposedly descriptive 
sentence ‘adultery is a bad human act’ to the imperative ‘you must not commit 
adultery’? . . . We must allow in the @rst place that the question, ‘Why should I’? 
or ‘Why shouldn’t I’? is a reasonable question, which calls for an answer, . . . and 
I think the only relevant answer is an appeal to something the questioner wants.” 
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sions of the sort, “if you want the job, you ought to apply (because applying 
is the only reliable means of getting what you want).” While “wants” may 
entail “ought,” the “ought” it entails is not something most people would 
recognize as moral obligation—instead it is an “unemphatic,” hypothet-
ical, or prudential “ought.”17 Desiring something is, quite obviously, not 
the same as being obliged to get it—in fallen nature, the appetites are not 
necessarily well ordered. Conversely, one may recognize a thing as morally 
obligatory without @nding it desirable in itself.
It is because of this disparity between “wants” and (moral) “ought,” 
between value and obligation, that one can @nd oneself struggling to do 
what one full-well knows to be right—a state that is possible precisely 
because what is known to be right is not necessarily desired to the same 
degree it is known to be right.18 Indeed this disparity is what makes formal 
sin psychologically possible: what I want is not necessarily what I am 
obliged to do, and what I am obliged to do is not necessarily what I most 
desire. Hence, the apprehension of value and the apprehension of obliga-
tion are distinct in actual human experience.
+e di=erence between the fact–value gap and the is–ought gap has 
been previously noticed by Alan Gewirth:
+e presence of choice and purpose in action, thus gives it a 
structure such that, from the standpoint of the agent, “I do X for 
purpose E” entails “X and E are good.” Since the latter statement is 
a value-judgment, or at least the function of such a judgment, to this 
extent from the standpoint of the agent the “fact-value” gap, even if 
not the “is-ought” gap, is already bridged in action.19
Whether Geach’s answer is a good answer or not depends, I think, on details 
which, he admits with candor and modesty, he has not developed: “On many 
points (e.g. the relation between desire and good . . .), I certainly do not see clear” 
(42).
17   See Philippa Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” !e Philo-
sophical Review 81 (1972): 305–16; repr. in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in 
Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 157–73. 
18   It is true, of course, that we frequently describe the moral norms that we recognize 
as our “moral values,” but this seems to me an imprecise use of the term “value.” If 
I believe it is morally wrong for a husband to cheat on his wife, this may justify the 
expression that I consider marital @delity “a value,” but that does not imply that I 
am immune to temptations to in@delity, nor even that I, personally, actually desire 
to be faithful. What it does imply is that I would be a hypocrite to commit adul-
tery. But such hypocrisy is not only possible but quite common among humans. 
19  Alan Gewirth, “+e ‘Is–Ought’ Problem Resolved,” Proceedings and Addresses of 
the American Philosophical Association 47 (1973–74): 34–61, at 51.
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Gewirth here notes that deliberate activity is necessarily predicated on 
some value, which motivates it; as Aquinas says, no one acts but for the 
sake of an end that is desired.20 But the sort of value that underlies and 
motivates all deliberate activity is not the same as a moral obligation. 
Although the very fact that an agent acts demonstrates the presence of 
value, desire, and inclination, and while the fact of deliberation already 
bespeaks some consciousness of goods as goods (that is, apprehension of 
things as able to satisfy those desires), nonetheless the fact of action does 
not necessarily imply any knowledge of obligation. What we value, care 
about, and desire is not necessarily virtuous, let alone obligatory.21 +at 
I desire or value something is enough for me to act for its sake, but that 
I have such a desire—a potential motive for deliberate action—does not 
entail that that desire is in any sense morally normative or that it bespeaks 
a moral obligation.22
One might insist that the derivation of obligation from value works if 
we identify value not with what we in fact desire, but with what we ought 
to desire; a7er all, in discussing the natural law Aquinas is more likely to 
speak of the desirable than the desired. For example, Henry Veatch @rst 
summarizes Germain Grisez with apparent approbation—“[the goods 
to be pursued] are objects of inclination in the sense of being things that 
we ought to be inclined towards, or should be inclined towards, whether 
we actually are or not”—before asserting in his own voice, “one may say 
that good or bonum is de@ned . . . not as that which simply is desired, but 
rather as that which is desirable, or ought to be desired,”23 But this does 
not close the gap for two reasons. First, it is not what one ought to desire 
but what one actually desires that provides a psychological motive of action. 
+us, Aquinas explicitly uses appetibile to describe both the true good (as 
apprehended by right reason) and apparent good (e.g., as apprehended by 
the senses against the apprehension of reason). For Aquinas, “the desirable” 
refers not just to what we ought to desire, but includes all that we actually 
20   ST I-II, q. 1, a. 1, corp. 
21   See for example, In IV sent., lib. 4, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, qc 1, ad 4.
22   See a parallel discussion in William Matthew Diem, “Reasons for Acting and the 
End of Man as Naturally Known: Reconceiving +omistic Axiology,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2019): 723–56, esp. 723–25.
23   Henry Veatch, “Natural Law and the ‘Is’–‘Ought’ Question,” Catholic Lawyer 26 
(1981): 251–65, at 262–63; see also 264. McInerny also seems to make such a 
move: “We ought to desire what we desire in the sense that the object of our desire 
ought to deserve the formality under which it is desired, viz., perfective and ful@ll-
ing” (Ethica !omistica, 37). 
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desire, including what we desire wrongly.24 Obviously, if an agent actually 
desires something, then it is able to be desired, and it is therefore also able 
to motivate deliberate action. Secondly, the judgment of what one ought 
to desire—if it is to give rise to moral “ought”—must already be morally 
normative. So this move only pushes the problem back, failing to bridge 
the divide between value and obligation as it purported to.
A subtler response was o=ered by Geach, who acknowledges the prob-
lem even as he suggests a solution:
It can, I think, be shown that an action’s being a good or bad 
human action is of itself something that touches the agent’s desires. 
Although calling a thing “a good A” or “a bad A” does not of itself 
work upon the hearer’s desires, it may be expected to do so if the 
hearer happens to be choosing an A. Now what a man cannot fail 
to be choosing is his manner of acting; so to call a manner of acting 
good or bad cannot but serve to guide action. . . . Calling an action 
good or bad does not depend for its e=ect as a suasion upon any 
individual peculiarities of desire.25
+is solution does not get us quite so far as it might at @rst seem to: we 
o7en act for the sake of ends beyond the act itself; action is routinely 
chosen only as a means to something further,26 and if we are choosing an 
act as a means, then in wanting a “good act,” what we cannot help but want 
is an e#ective (one might say “prudent” or “shrewd”) act—an act that will 
obtain the end for whose sake we are acting—which is not obviously the 
same as a morally good act. Of course, we can argue the further point that 
a truly e=ective act, a truly prudent act, is an act that brings us to our ulti-
mate and most valued end—the happiness that we all necessarily desire and 
for whose sake we always act. With yet further argument, we might show 
that the truly e=ective act will, as it turns out, always be a morally good act. 
Certainly such an argument can be made (indeed Aquinas made one very 
much like it27), but making such an argument amounts to demonstrating 
24   In III de an., lec. 15, nos. 9–10.
25   Geach, “Good and Evil,” 40.
26   Admittedly, in some cases the end may itself be a form of activity (e.g., those play-
ing a game may desire the very act of playing as an end and a debater may relish 
the argument itself ), but even here, the end desired is usually the speci@c sort of 
act (e.g., playing the game or arguing), not acting simply. +e fact we choose to 
act does not imply that we desire to perform good human acts as such, that is, in 
general. 
27   ST I-II, q. 55, a. 3, corp. (“virtue implies a perfection of power; . . . every evil is a 
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to a person that, whether he realizes it or not, what he really implicitly 
wants above all else, what will really satisfy his deepest desires and make 
him truly happy, is to be virtuous. But the very fact that one must estab-
lish this by argument, the fact that one must persuade a person to desire 
virtue explicitly by showing that only virtue can satisfy man’s deepest 
desire, proves that the concept of obligation (or of moral uprightness more 
generally) and the concept of value are distinct: To apprehend something as 
obligatory or morally right is not the same as apprehending it as ful@lling 
an experienced desire. Showing that morally good action is—precisely in 
being morally good—a uniquely e=ective means of achieving the happiness 
that one cannot help but desire requires proof: It has to be shown, as Geach 
himself admits, for it is not immediately obvious to most agents that a truly 
e=ective act is precisely the same as a morally good act.
To deny this distinction between value and obligation, to hold instead 
that obligations arise from a prior value, seems to me to be disastrous to 
the project of ethics. I have already noted that the psychological possibil-
ity of sin requires a distinction between value and obligation. As but one 
further example, without this distinction between “ought” and “wants,” 
the fourfold distinction of continent, incontinent, virtuous, and vicious 
collapses.28
In making such a distinction between the notions of “good” (in the 
sense of “desired by the agent” and therefore a possible motive of delib-
erate action) and “morally obligatory,” I am cutting across the grain of 
the contemporary dispute over “is” and “ought” in Aquinas’s natural law 
theory. Although there is a @erce, decades-long debate among +omists 
over whether “ought” is derived from “is,”29 both camps of +omistic natu-
ral lawyers concur in rooting our apprehension of moral “ought” directly in 
some prior apprehension of value or good.
+ose who insist that “ought” can be derived from “is” hold that we 
weakness”), and II-II, q. 145, a. 3, ad 3, explaining Ambrose and Cicero: “Nothing 
incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it is 
contrary to man’s last end, which is a good in accordance with reason; although it 
may perhaps be useful in some respect, with regard to a particular end.”
28   See In III de an., lec., 14, nos. 22–23.
29   +e principal parties to this debate are the New Natural Lawyers—John Finnis, 
Germain Grisez, and their numerous collaborators, including Robert George 
and Christopher Tollefson—who insist that practical “ought” knowledge cannot 
be derived from speculative “is” knowledge, and their critics: Veatch, Russell 
Hittinger, McInerney, Long, Jensen, and others. Although he defends a distinct 
theory of natural law, Martin Rhonheimer concurs with the New Natural Lawyers 
in maintaining a sharp distinction between practical and speculative knowledge. 
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begin with a speculative understanding of human nature, of what is 
perfective of human nature, or of what is the telos of human nature. From 
this understanding of human nature in general we can, they hold, imme-
diately grasp that those things we understand to be perfective of humans 
are goods and therefore, too, things that we, as humans, ought to pursue. 
+us Robert George summarizes the “neo-scholastic” counterposition to 
New Natural Law theory:
A sound natural law ethics [the critics hold] derives moral norms 
from methodologically antecedent knowledge of the nature of 
man and of man’s place in nature. According to this approach, 
metaphysics—in particular that branch of metaphysics that studies 
man—precedes ethics. . . . One discovers what one ought to do by 
understanding the facts about human nature.30
On the other hand, George writes that the New Natural Lawyers, who 
insist that there is an is–ought gap,
reject [the neo-Scholastics’] approach . . . they maintain that it 
involves “the naturalistic fallacy” of purporting to infer moral 
norms from facts about human nature. Logically, a valid conclusion 
cannot introduce something that is not in the premises. . . . [Moral 
norms] cannot be derived from premises (e.g., facts about human 
nature) that do not include reasons for action. According to Grisez 
and others, natural law theory need not—and a credible natural law 
theory cannot—rely on this logically illicit inference from facts to 
norms.31
+us, according to the New Natural Lawyers, moral norms can only be 
derived from premises that already contain “reasons for action”; these 
prior reasons for action, the New Natural Lawyers hold, are the basic 
human goods, which are apprehended by practical reason as self-evidently 
desirable. +us, Christopher Tollefsen writes: “Practical reason . . . grasps 
as self-evidently desirable a number of basic goods . . . described as consti-
tutive aspects of genuine human Kourishing. . . . As grasped by practical 
30   Robert P. George, “Natural Law and Human Nature,” in Natural Law !eory: 
Contemporary Essays, ed. Robert George (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
31–4,1 at 32 and 33. He speci@cally refers to R. Hittinger, L. Weinreb, H. Veatch, 
R. McInerny. 
31   George, “Natural Law and Human Nature,” 32–33.
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reason, the basic goods give foundational reasons for action to human 
agents.”32 What is signi@cant, for present purposes, is not the intermedi-
ate steps in the derivation of the @rst moral norms from the basic goods, 
but simply the fact that the @rst moral obligations are (according to the 
theory) logically derived from “self-evidently desirable,” “basic human 
goods,” which already present us with “foundational reasons for action,” 
and which we cannot help but care about. +us, John Finnis notes that 
a deduction of “ought” requires advertence to some “desire or interest of 
the agent’s that might be satis@ed by acting rightly,”33 and George notes 
that, “to conclude to speci@c moral norms, . . . one’s premises must include 
reasons for action that are more fundamental than those norms.”34 “We 
cannot,” he says, “deduce or infer reasons for action from premises that do 
not include reasons for action. We cannot deduce or infer basic reasons for 
action from anything.”35
+us both schools root our apprehension of obligation immediately 
in a prior apprehension of value or good, in the sense of a potential 
motive or “reason for action.” +is shared commitment is seen most 
readily in the conKation of the fact–value gap and the is–ought gap; as 
we already noted, it is commonly presumed that deducing values from 
facts is equivalent to deducing moral norms from facts—although the 
parties di=er insofar as one accepts such deduction as foundational to 
ethics and the other rejects it as fallacious. Consider, for example, Long’s 
retort to Finnis’s insistence that there is an is–ought gap: “If nature is 
ordered hierarchically toward certain ends, . . . then knowledge of these 
natural ends will itself contain implicit reasons for action.”36 Or again, 
consider McInerny’s puzzling assertion that “merely factual desire, such 
32   Christopher Tollefson, “+e New Natural Law +eory,” Lyceum 10 (2008): 1–17, 
at 2.
33   Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 40–41.
34   George, “Natural Law and Human Nature,” 41n20. 
35   George, “Natural Law and Human Nature,” 38.
36   Steven A. Long, “+rough the Analytic Looking Glass,” !e !omist 65 (2001): 
259–300, at 268. While one must note that he is merely responding to the objec-
tion as formulated by Finnis, my point remains that in recent +omistic literature 
moving from “is” to “ought” is routinely understood as equivalent to moving from 
facts to reasons or motives for acting. I should add that, while I concede that 
speculative knowledge of the good might elicit desire (or as Long elsewhere puts it, 
“incite” or “spark” [Teleological Grammar, 73, 75]), still, I insist, @rst, that eliciting 
is di=erent from entailing and, second, that desire is di=erent from “ought.” One 
might locate an antecedent to Long in Geach, “Good and Evil,” 42: “I have argued 
that the characteristic of being a good or bad human action is of itself bound to 
inKuence the agent's desire.”
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as is required for the Humean problem, does not exist”37 (although 
Hume’s problem says not a word about desire). +is shared presumption 
is also made clear by their unanimous teaching that a moral obligation 
is a necessary means to a necessary end (where “necessary end” names 
something inescapably desired by the agent, e.g., happiness, Kourishing, 
or “integral human ful@llment”).38
+is shared assumption is quite natural for at least two reasons. +e 
@rst is that (as McInerny rightly notes39) the locus classicus of the +omistic 
natural law tradition—Summa theologiae [ST] I-II, q. 94, a. 2—essentially 
enshrines the implication of “ought” by “wants” in the @rst principle of 
practical reason and then derives the @rst “precepts” of the natural law 
immediately from our natural inclinations to various goods:
+e @rst principle of practical reason is . . . “good is to be done and 
pursued, and evil is to be avoided.” . . . Hence it is that all those things 
to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended 
by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, 
and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance . . . Wherefore 
according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the 
precepts of the natural law.40
By identifying those things to which man has a natural inclination we can 
immediately conclude that those things “are to be pursued,” and the arti-
37   McInerny, Ethica !omistica, 38.
38   +us Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 45–46: “Aquinas . . . treats obliga-
tion as the rational necessity of some means to . . . an end or objective (i.e., a good) 
of a particular sort. What sort? Primarily . . . the good of a form of life which . . 
. renders one a @tting subject for a friendship of the being whose friendship is a 
basic good that in its full realization embraces all aspects of human well-being, a 
friendship indispensable for every person.” For a recent example of this teaching 
in neo-Scholastic +omists, see Jensen, Knowing the Natural Law, 167–74; true, 
Jensen explicitly denies that the hypothetical “ought” is “derived from the desires 
of the individual,” but he also holds that “since everyone wants some of the goods 
of nature, nature can impose a universal hypothetical necessity” (173; empha-
sis mine). +is explanation of obligation has a history; it can be found in, e.g.: 
Austin Fagothey, Right and Reason, 2nd ed. (Charlotte, NC: TAN Books, 2000), 
198–201; Michael Cronin, !e Science of Ethics, vol. 1, General Ethics (Dublin: 
M. H. Gill and Son, 1909), 218–19; and Luigi Taparelli, Saggio Teoretico di Drito 
Naturale Appoggiato sul Fatto, 2nd ed. (Livorno: Vincenzo Mansi, 1851), 91–92.
39   McInerny, Ethica !omistica, 38.
40   Translation of the Summa theologiae that of the Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province, second revised edition, 1920.
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cle appears to identify this judgment with the @rst moral precepts of the 
natural law.41
 +e second reason is that Aquinas says, quite explicitly and on multiple 
occasions, that the necessity which moral obligation places on the will 
is the necessity of the end—that is, the hypothetical necessity of willing 
some means in order to attain some end. +us he writes: “+e other [kind 
of necessity, the sort that is compatible with voluntariness] arises from 
the obligation of a ‘command,’ or from the necessity of obtaining an end, 
when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without doing 
some particular thing.”42 And, he explains the power of conscience to bind 
the will by appeal to the necessity of the end:
+e other necessity is conditional, on the presupposition, that is, of 
an end to be attained. In this way, necessity is so imposed on one 
that, if he does not do a certain thing, he will not receive his reward. 
. . . [+is sort of necessity] can be imposed on the will, so that one 
must, for example, choose this means if he is to acquire this good, 
or avoid this evil.43
Hence Aquinas seems to identify moral obligation with the hypothetical 
necessity derived from our desire for an end, and so the two schools of 
natural law theorists seem to be well justi@ed in their common teaching 
that the binding power of obligation is derived from value.
We will return to these texts below, but note, for the moment, that 
these accounts, as di=erent as they are, universally concur in asserting that 
some apprehension of the agent’s good immediately underlies every appre-
hension of obligation: we apprehend obligation only because we $rst appre-
hended our good as humans. Both sides in the debate take it for granted 
that obligations are reasons for acting derived from prior a apprehension 
of what is good and desirable to human agents. +e principal di=erence 
between the two schools, which gives rise to the dispute, is how they hold 
that we come to apprehend our goods in the @rst place: do we deduce them 
from speculative knowledge of human nature or does practical reason itself 
simply apprehend them as self-evidently desirable?
But if my contention is correct, then this shared point of departure 
41   I have elsewhere argued that Aquinas is not, in fact, speaking of the natural law 
as a moral law here. See William Matthew Diem, “+e Analogy of Natural Law: 
Aquinas on First Precepts,” !e Heythrop Journal, forthcoming.
42   ST II-II, q. 58, a. 3, ad 2. Cf. ST I, q. 19, a. 3, corp.; I, q. 82, a. 1. 
43   De veritate, q. 17, a. 3, corp.; cf. ST I-II, q. 99, a. 5, corp. 
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must be mistaken, for it conKates value and obligation and treats the is–
ought gap as the fact–value gap. I, however, insist that obligation is appre-
hended independently of any consideration of the agent’s good or end or 
desire. +us, for example, the question whether I morally ought or ought 
not to kidnap and vivisect strangers for the thrill of the experience can be 
answered without ever considering whether such behavior is good for me or 
ful@lls one of my desires or is conducive to my perfection; such questions 
are utterly irrelevant to determining its moral rightness.44 Whether an act 
will satisfy some desire of mine—ful@lling me, and bringing me closer to 
happiness—will be important in determining whether it is possible for me 
to choose that act, but that is a distinct, second question, and that second 
question need not be answered before I can determine whether the act is 
morally right or wrong in the @rst place.45 I need not suspend my moral 
judgment of such heinous acts until I have determined their likelihood of 
making me happy. +e only good one must consider to judge such an act 
of wanton torture simply wrong is—I insist—the good of the potential 
victim.46
44   New Natural Lawyers may retort that, on their account, the goods in question 
are not speci@cally my goods, but are general human goods that remain good 
regardless of who possesses each instance of each good. My reply to this is twofold: 
First, only my goods—those things for which I have some appetite, inclination, 
or desire—move me to act. Other persons’ goods, considered as such, do not 
constitute self-evident reasons for me to act (altruistic behavior is possible when, 
through love, we identify with the other and therefore come to view and desire the 
good of the other as our own); +e good of another, as such, does not necessarily 
correspond to any desire I experience. Second, if we consider the quotation from 
Finnis in note 38 above, it is clear that the good in question is “indispensable” to 
each agent precisely insofar as it is a good of the individual agent. +e point is also 
clear in Natural Law and Natural Rights, 40–41, quoted in note 4 above.
45   +is emphasis on my desires is not to exclude or ignore common goods. While 
one may have a natural desire for common goods, such goods are motives for me to 
act only to the extent that I actually have some desire or inclination to them. For 
example, friendship may move me to seek the other’s good for the other’s sake, but 
I am so moved only if I already have a desire and inclination for friendship. 
46   Determining what, speci@cally, is good or bad for the other may depend on my 
knowledge of what is good for me (I do not want to be vivisected, and therefore, 
in the absence of a relevant distinction between us, it is probably harmful for other 
humans to be vivisected). In this limited and speci@c respect my good and my 
desires may end up being relevant to answering the question of what is right or 
wrong for me to do. My point, however, survives this concession: I do not need 
to consider whether vivisecting (actively) will or will not be an e=ective means to 
achieving my eudaemonia or ful@llment or happiness to determine whether I ought 
or ought not vivisect another. Consideration of my good, as such, is not relevant; it 
is relevant only to the extent that it gives me an insight into the other’s good.
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Obligation and Value in Aquinas’s Account of Practical Reason
+us far I have argued, @rst, that value—such as can serve as a motive 
for action—cannot be derived from speculative knowledge of fact, and 
second, that such value is, in principle, distinct from obligation. Although I 
have suggested along the way that Aquinas concurs with these contentions, 
we must now consider Aquinas’s treatment of value and obligation in prac-
tical reason more systematically.
When we turn to Aquinas's treatment of practical reason, we encoun-
ter an apparent circle. On the one hand, Aquinas frequently insists that 
practical reason takes its @rst principles from the appetites, while on the 
other hand, he insists just as frequently that the rectitude of the appetites 
consists in their being conformed to right reason. +us, the practical intel-
lect seems both to follow and to lead the appetites.
For example, he holds that practical intellect follows appetite because 
the end desired by the appetites stands to the practical intellect as specula-
tive principles stand to the speculative intellect. +is is why prudence—or 
“right reason about things to be done,”47 which perfects the practical intel-
lect—presupposes the other moral virtues, which perfect the appetites.48 It 
is equally why false prudence (as found, for example, in a “good robber”) 
is possible: true prudence presupposes the uprightness of desire e=ected by 
the other moral virtues, particularly justice.49 +is is also the crux of his 
distinction between prudence and art: prudence presupposes the actual 
desire for the end, whereas art merely includes knowledge of how to bring 
about an end without regard for whether that end is desired; thus the one 
who willingly “sins” against his art more fully possesses the habit of his 
art than the one who inadvertently sins against his art, though it is the 
opposite with prudence.50 Hence, practical reason as informed by prudence 
presupposes appetite.
But, showing that reason leads the appetites, he writes, “the end 
concerns the moral virtues, not as though they appointed the end, but 
because they tend to the end which is appointed by natural reason,”51 and 
again, “the proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely in conformity 
with right reason.”52
47   ST I-II, q. 57, a. 4, corp.
48   ST I-II, q. 65, a. 1, corp. See also ST I-II, q. 57, a. 4, corp. 
49   ST II-II, q. 47, a. 13, esp. ad 2. See also, ST I-II, q. 57, a. 3, ad 2.
50   ST I-II, q. 57, a. 4, corp. See also I-II, q. 57, a. 3, corp., ad 2 and ad 3, and De veri-
tate, q. 2, a. 8, corp. 
51   ST II-II, q. 47, a. 6, ad 3 (Emphasis mine). 
52   ST II-II, q. 47, a. 7, corp.
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So we are le7 with a question: Does practical reason lead the appetites 
or does it follow the appetites? Does practical reason take the ends %om the 
appetites, or does practical reason appoint the ends to the appetites?
+e apparent circularity, but also the beginning of its resolution, can 
be seen nicely when he writes that, “reason, as apprehending the end, 
precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the 
reason, as arguing about the choice of the means, which is the concern of 
prudence.”53
+e solution that the text suggests is that there are two di=erent func-
tions of reason in guiding action. +e @rst is in apprehending the end, the 
second is in arranging the means to that end (which, he says here and else-
where, is the work of prudence). +e intellect’s act of apprehending the end 
is prior to appetite, but its act of arranging the means to that end follows 
the appetite for the end.
+e reason which “appoints the end” to the appetites is, Aquinas explic-
itly says, synderesis, not prudence: “Natural reason known by the name of 
‘synderesis’ appoints the end to moral virtues, . . . but prudence does not do 
this.”54 Synderesis is the intellectual habit that apprehends the @rst moral 
precepts, the @rst norms of the natural law,55 which norms conscience then 
applies to individual acts.56 And as we just saw, synderesis appoints the 
end to the appetites, while prudence presupposes the end desired by the 
appetites.57
Hence we have two practical functions of reason. One precedes appe-
tite, begins in synderesis, @rst apprehends moral law, and determines the 
end of the moral virtues. +is is the “right reason” that is the measure of 
moral good and in comparison to which we determine what is virtuous; 
this is the practical reasoning whose @nal judgment is conscience. +e 
other sort of practical reasoning follows appetite, takes the ends desired 
by the appetites as its principles, and arranges the means to those desired 
ends, and this is the practical reasoning that is informed by prudence.
We can also see this distinction drawn when Aquinas asserts that there 
are two di=erent sets of principles operative in practical reason—universal 
and particular—and that only the latter of these is subject to error.
53   ST I-II, q. 58, a. 5, ad 1. He makes a similar point in I-II, q. 19, a. 3, ad 2.
54   ST II-II, q. 47, a. 6, ad 1. But compare this with I-II, q. 66, a. 3, ad 3, where he 
seems to say otherwise. +ough I am here distinguishing two functions of prac-
tical reason, as I will note below, in practice, the two functions are closely bound 
together.
55   De veritate, q. 16, a. 1, corp.
56   De veritate, q. 17, a. 1, ad 1. 
57   ST II-II, q. 47, a. 6, ad 1, ad 3.
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As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by the 
natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that 
he should do no evil. . . . Consequently, as by the habit of natural 
understanding, . . . man is made to be rightly disposed in regard 
to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be rightly 
disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the 
ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes 
connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. +is is done 
by moral virtue.58
+e universal principles appear to be normative (e.g., “that one should do 
no evil”), and they are grasped by “natural understanding of principles” 
(which, I believe, must refer to synderesis). +e particular principles of 
practical reason are the ends themselves that are actually desired by the 
appetites informed by the moral virtues. Elsewhere he is perfectly clear 
that, on the one hand, the actually desired ends (the principles of practical 
reason as it follows appetite and arranges the means to the end) can be evil 
in those who lack the moral virtues (giving rise to false prudence), while 
on the other hand, he is equally clear that synderesis (which provides the 
@rst principles to practical reason preceding and ruling appetite) is immune 
from error.59 +us, we clearly @nd in Aquinas two distinct functions of 
“practical reason,” each with its own @rst principles.
+e distinction between these two functions of practical reason corre-
sponds perfectly with the distinction I previously drew between value and 
obligation: +e practical reason that leads appetite treats obligation, while 
the practical reason that follows appetite treats value. Synderesis provides 
conscience its @rst moral principles, its most fundamental and general obli-
gations or “ought” statements; it provides us—Aquinas says explicitly—
with our @rst apprehension of the precepts of the natural law whereby we 
distinguish right from wrong. But that practical reasoning is distinct from 
the practical reasoning that begins with an object desired by the appetites 
and arranges the means to it. +e practical reason that determines what 
one (morally) “ought” to do and the practical reason that determines 
how one (prudentially or shrewdly) “ought” to act in order to achieve 
what one desires are distinct and discrete. In other words, for Aquinas, 
moral “ought” (apprehended by synderesis and applied by conscience) and 
58   ST I-II, q. 58, a. 5, corp. 
59   Quodlibet XII, a. 3, corp.; De veritate, q. 16, a. 2, corp.; q. 16, a. 1. Cf.: ST I, q. 79, 
a. 12, corp.; De malo, q. 3, a. 12, ad 13; q. 16, a. 6, ad sc 6; In II sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 
4, ad 3.
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prudential or hypothetical “ought”—which tells us how to attain what we 
desire—are distinct.60
But if obligation and value are distinct and if one can know what one 
morally ought to do independently of any desire to do it, how can knowl-
edge of obligation guide action? If obligation is not itself a motive for 
action, how can knowledge of what one ought to do ever provide a reason, 
let alone an overriding reason, for acting morally?
Knowledge of obligation can become a motive for action because man 
has a natural desire to live reasonably, that is, virtuously. Hence Aquinas 
notes: “+ere is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance with 
reason. . . . It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, accord-
ing to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection,”61 and 
elsewhere, “there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to 
reason: and this is to act according to virtue.”62 +is inclination is mani-
fested in the phenomenon we call in English the “pangs of conscience” or 
in what Aquinas calls the “worm of conscience”:63 we experience knowl-
edge of guilt as painful because guilt frustrates a natural desire, namely, the 
natural desire to live according to reason. +us, conformity to the dictates 
of right reason (i.e., to the judgments of conscience) is itself apprehended 
as desirable (in the sense of being an object of experienced desire and thus 
having what it takes to motivate deliberate activity). Obeying the judg-
ments of conscience ful@lls man’s natural desire to live according to reason, 
and therefore it can always be taken sub specie boni and become a value that 
moves the will.
+e reason we are tempted to identify the is–ought gap and the fact–
value gap is that there is a clear and close relationship between these two 
functions of practical reason. Knowing what I morally ought to do is 
irrelevant trivia if it cannot move me to act. +e whole point of obligation 
is to direct our voluntary actions, so the suggestion that obligations do 
60   For the diBculties in determining the relationship between conscience and 
prudence, see Pius Mary Noonan, “Auriga et Genetrix: le rôle de la prudence dans 
le jugement de la conscience,” Revue thomiste 114 (2014): 355–77, 531–68. 
61   ST I-II, q. 63, a. 1, corp. +e same point is o7en repeated: e.g., De veritate, q. 16, a. 
1, ad 9; ST II-II, q. 47, a. 7, corp.; a. 6, corp.
62   ST I-II, q. 94, a. 3; Remember the general principle from the prior article: “Since, 
however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it 
is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally appre-
hended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their 
contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance.”
63   In IV sent., d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, qc 5, corp.; ST Suppl., q. 67, a. 2. I am aware that this is 
an analogous use of “conscience,” but I am concerned with the thing not the word. 
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not of themselves serve as motives of action seems too absurd to merit 
consideration. But although there is a close relation between them—such 
that what is judged right by reason is ipso facto also the object of a natural 
desire—the question of what reason has determined is to be done and the 
question of whether what is to be done is somehow desirable remain, in 
principle, distinct. We do not grasp that an act is obligatory because we @rst 
grasp that it is somehow desirable. Rather, what reason judges is to be done 
is also grasped as desirable precisely because it is uniquely reasonable—that 
is, because reason has determined that it is, unquali@edly, to be done.
We can see this in Aquinas’s treatment of the upright (honestas), which 
he holds is the same as the virtuous.64 He argues that everything upright is 
both naturally pleasurable to man65 and naturally desired by man, precisely 
because the upright is conveniens rationi.66
It is precisely in the logical order that it posits between the apprehension 
of obligation and the awareness of a relevant natural desire that the theory 
I am espousing is distinct from the interpretations of natural law I earlier 
criticized. I hold that we $rst apprehend what is right and only then do we 
naturally recognize that what is right is by that fact also desirable. +e 
theories I earlier rejected hold that our apprehension of obligation follows 
from our prior apprehension of goodness and desirability: we @rst appre-
hend a good (as desirable) and from that apprehension we somehow derive 
an obligation. But I insist that I do not need to consult my desires or my 
teleology to determine what I am obliged to do or not do.67 +e recogni-
tion that doing what I am obliged to do satis@es a particularly important 
natural desire is a logically discrete step that follows on my recognition 
that the act is obligatory in the @rst place; the desire does not constitute 
that obligation as obligatory, it follows on my apprehension of the act as 
obligatory. Not only can I desire something without being obligated to 
get it, but I can also be obligated to do something that I do not naturally 
@nd desirable considered aside from its being obligatory, reasonable, and 
virtuous, just as the useful is not necessarily pleasant in itself, aside from 
its being useful.68
What I have proposed is consistent with how Aquinas describes 
conscience’s power to bind us in De veritate. A7er asking whether 
64   ST II-II, q. 145, aa. 1–3.
65   ST II-II, q. 145, a. 3, corp. 
66   ST II-II, 145, a. 3, ad 1; a. 2, ad 1.
67   Of course, my (natural) desires may be an important source of content, as is clear 
from the “golden rule.” See note 46 above.
68   In IV sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, qc 4, ad 4; ST II-II, q. 145, a. 3. 
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conscience binds, he replies, yes, it binds us: by making us aware of the 
precept of a ruler, it imposes on the will a necessity %om without and so 
compels us to choose what we do not desire; nonetheless, it binds us only by 
stipulating a condition for achieving good and avoiding evil.69 Here we @nd 
both sides of the problem: we are bound by a lawgiver to do what we do 
not otherwise wish to do, but the will can only be bound in a conditional 
or hypothetical sort of way—hence it remains free. On the condition of 
obtaining what speci@c end is the will thus bound? What is the good that 
can only be obtained through obedience to conscience and conformity to 
law? Moral obligation, he explicitly says elsewhere, binds the will insofar as 
“a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without doing some particular 
thing.”70 But virtue is nothing else than living in conformity with right 
reason. We desire to live reasonably, and this desire can only be ful@lled 
by doing what “reason dictates . . . must be done,”71 that is, by obeying 
conscience. Virtue, he quite explicitly says, is natural to us not insofar as 
man is naturally inclined to each virtuous act, but insofar as man has a 
general, natural inclination to live according to reason.72 Indeed, Aqui-
nas notes that the @rst order to which the human will is subject is the 
order of his own reason, an order that is enforced through the pangs of 
conscience.73 Our conscience troubles us because we violated the judg-
ment of reason in doing what we knew was wrong; we do not know that 
something is wrong because we @rst anticipated that our conscience would 
trouble us if we were to do it.
+us the link between the two roles of “practical intellect” is found 
in the rational appetite. One function of the practical intellect guides 
the will; in apprehending and applying moral norms, it establishes the 
conditions of ful@lling our natural appetite for living according to reason. 
+e other function of the practical intellect arranges the means to the 
end desired by the will.74 +e intellect apprehends moral norms (initially 
69   De veritate, q. 17, a. 3, corp.
70   ST II-II, q. 58, a. 3, ad 2 (emphasis mine). Cf. ST I-II, q. 99, a. 5, corp. 
71   ST I-II, q. 99, a. 5, corp.
72   ST I-II, q. 94, a. 3, corp.: “If we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. 
in their proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: 
for many things are done virtuously, to which nature does not incline at @rst; but 
which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive to 
well-living.” 
73   ST I-II, q. 87, a. 1, corp.
74  +ough even here the intellect is guiding the will, although with respect to the 
means rather than the end. Hence, there is in fact a constant interplay between 
intellect and will.
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though synderesis) and, applying these norms, determines which speci@c 
acts are and which are not in conformity with right reason (through 
conscience). Because we have a natural inclination to live according to 
reason, that which conscience has determined is to be done ipso facto also 
acquires the speciem boni, so that it can be willed. Of course, this inclina-
tion to live according to reason is only one of many natural inclinations,75 
and there are many particular things that reason demands of us that we do 
not naturally desire in themselves.76 It is therefore possible for us to face a 
moral struggle—to @nd ourselves torn between competing goods—and 
even to sin by willfully violating conscience.77 In either case, one can then 
will to deliberate, making use of reason to arrange the means to the end 
willed—this is the realm of prudence. Synderesis thus leads prudence,78 
but only through the mediation of right appetite.
 From Speculative to Practical
If “practical reason” does not only extend to some one and uni@ed process 
of reasoning, if instead, there are at least two essentially disparate processes 
of reasoning that Aquinas labels “practical”—one that precedes and guides 
the appetite for the end by appointing the end of the moral virtues, and 
another that follows and is led by the appetite for the end, taking as its prin-
ciples the ends actually desired by the appetites, and arranging the means 
to those ends—and if, moreover, each has its own @rst principles, then the 
famous +omistic disputes over the is–ought problem have their origin in 
a fundamental confusion.
Once our distinctions have been drawn, the is–ought problem loses its 
moment. +e reason the is–ought problem was a problem for +omists 
was that, as I showed above, we expected our answer to the is–ought gap 
equally to bridge the fact–value gap. We expected moral norms to touch 
desire and immediately provide the will with reasons for acting. Our 
search was destined to fail: if value is in principle distinct from obligation, 
then there can be no one thing that explains, with equal immediacy, both 
our recognition of obligation and our apprehension of value. We expected 
our apprehension of obligation to provide our will with a decisive reason to 
75   In III de an., lec. 15, no. 10, where he distinguishes the appetible into apparent 
good and true good based on whether the appetible is good in the judgment of 
reason or good only on account of an appetite or phantasm against the judgment 
of reason.
76   ST I-II, q. 94, a. 3, corp.
77   De veritate, q. 17, a. 1, ad 4. 
78   ST II-II, q. 47, a. 6, ad 3.
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do what is right, when in fact moral obligation is only decisive to the intel-
lect. Indeed, this disparity is the heart of sin and fault: formal sin, violation 
of conscience, is precisely the refusal of the will to do what the intellect has 
judge absolutely and unquali@edly to be done.79 Sin is nothing else than 
the will’s nolo to intellect’s debeo. To conKate value and obligation is to 
destroy the notion of sin.
But, if value and obligation are two discrete concepts, treated by two 
fundamentally di=erent intellectual processes, starting from two radically 
di=erent sets of principles, then the famous diBculties evaporate.80 Once 
we have made this distinction, what follows is that there is no need to deny 
that a speculative apprehension can immediately give rise to an apprehen-
sion of moral norms: moral norms are not value statements, and so the gap 
between fact and value need not be overcome in deriving moral norms. 
Moral norms do not immediately and of themselves provide a motive to 
the will, neither do they immediately, of themselves touch desire or incli-
nation. And if synderesis need not bridge the fact–value gap in discovering 
the @rst moral norms, then it is free to derive “ought” from speculative 
apprehension.
+e speci@c class of apprehensions I have in mind are those that pertain 
to owing something to someone. As an example,81 the concept of vowing 
seems to me a speculative notion, and understanding what a vow is appears 
to me to be manifestly a work of the speculative intellect. At the same 
time, whether someone, in fact, made a vow or not is straightforwardly 
79   Jensen, following Foot, notes this disparity, though he, like early Foot, takes it as a 
sign of the incoherence of the notion of “moral ought” (Knowing the Natural Law, 
151 and 174).
80   Making this distinction is not attacking a straw man. A recent example of this 
confusion can be seen in Jensen, Knowing the Natural Law, 126–49 (ch. 7), esp. 
144, where he takes prudence as essentially exhaustive of practical reason and 
therefore as the way we come to know obligation. (In light of this, we should 
hardly be surprised that Jensen concludes that all “ought” statements are hypo-
thetical, unemphatic, or prudential; if we assume that prudence is coextensive with 
practical reason and that therefore “ought” statements arise from prudence, then 
naturally we will @nd only prudential instances of “ought.”) +e problem in this 
approach is that prudence is a function of the practical reason that follows appetite, 
not the practical reason that guides appetite through apprehension of natural law. 
In here criticizing Jensen on this point, I equally criticize myself: in my review of 
Jensen, I followed him in this move; see my review Knowing the Natural Law in 
Studies in Christian Ethics 29 (2016): 356–59.
81   What follows is inspired by John Searle, “How to Derive Ought from Is,” !e 
Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 43–58, at 44. While inspired by his work, I do not 
mean to endorse all that Searle has said on this issue. 
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a question of fact. But, on the other hand, that speculative concept of 
vowing is meaningless if it does not include the idea of placing oneself 
under an obligation or, equivalently, of placing oneself in a relationship of 
owing something to another. If such concepts as obligation and owing are 
removed from the concept of vowing, then nothing is le7 in the notion of 
vowing. Similarly, if one owes something to another, one ought, so far as 
reason is concerned, to render it to him. +e result is that a person who 
does not understand that (all things being equal) one ought to ful@ll one’s 
vows does not understand what a vow is.82 Of course, knowing what a vow 
is and knowing that one ought to do what one has vowed do not imply 
that one wants to ful@ll his vows, precisely because the notion of obligation 
does not of itself imply desire.
As another example, consider property. +e concept of property, just 
in itself, seems to me a speculative concept, while holding title to some 
property is, in principle, a matter of fact. But it is a matter of fact that 
immediately entails that others have certain duties (not, for example, to 
interfere with the owner’s use of his property, absent some compelling 
justi@cation).83 Owning something is meaningless if it does not entail 
some rights over against other agents with respect to the thing owned.
I do not mean to dismiss the complexity of these topics. One may enter-
tain perfectly sound questions about what matters of fact establish a title 
82   Of course, one may deny that there are such things as vows, i.e., communicative 
acts that place the speaker under an obligation; this amounts to rejecting the insti-
tution of vowing (see Charles Pigden, “Hume on Is and Ought: Logic, Promises 
and the Duke of Wellington,” in !e Oxford Handbook of Hume, ed. Paul Russell 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016], 401–15, for a summary of these issues). 
And such a one may even persist in speaking of “vows” in a purely descriptive sense 
while explicitly denying that they impose any obligation on a person. But such a 
person is really denying the intelligibility of vowing as a concept. +at person’s 
attitude is precisely to insist that the notion of vowing is incoherent. +is is what I 
mean by saying the person does not understand the term. And although he might 
well be able to use the word competently, he may also choose to surround it with 
scare quotes to make clear that he rejects the intelligibility of the concept that the 
word is meant to express: it is to him a mere label, and he doesn’t actually believe 
that the person has made a vow. As an analogous example, one might deny the 
intelligibility of the institution of slavery—holding that it is simply incoherent to 
believe that a person actually can really be mere property—and yet be able to use 
the word competently in light of a legal and social institution. 
83   See the discussion of speculatively practical knowledge in Reginald Garrigou-La-
grange, “Remarks Concerning the Metaphysical Character of St. +omas’s Moral 
+eology, in Particular as It Is Related to Prudence and Conscience,” trans. 
Matthew K. Minerd with notes, Nova et Vetera (English) 17 (2019): 245–70, at 
266–69.
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to some property, and the answers to such questions may be complicated, 
contingent, and culturally conditioned. +e point, however, is that once 
we acknowledge that there is such a thing as real, honest-to-God owner-
ship of property, rather than a mere social convention, we can immediately 
conclude that, in whatever cases that relation of ownership applies (which 
is, in principle, a question of fact), something is owed to the owner, and 
what follows from such owing is that (ceteris paribus) it would be unrea-
sonable not to render what is owed him. +e point is a tautology: we owe 
to others what is their own. It is worth noting, here, that if we expand the 
notion of property to include not just chattels but anything that a person 
can call his own in some meaningful and objective sense, and if we expand 
the corresponding notion of owning to the notion of dominium, then we 
can quickly account for the vast majority of traditional natural rights (like 
a person’s right to life) and indeed all the precepts of the Decalogue.
In fact, I think this derivation of obligation from notions like owing or 
owning is precisely the reasoning behind Aquinas’s somewhat perplexing 
example in ST I-II q. 94, a. 4: One cannot assent to the descriptions that 
this is another’s property and that one holds it in trust without also recog-
nizing that it is due to the owner and that it would be unreasonable (ceteris 
paribus) not to return it to him. And to recognize that this thing one has 
is due to the another is nothing else than to recognize that one has a duty, 
ceteris paribus,84 to return it to him.
Most generally, this is the reason that Aquinas repeatedly o=ers that 
the @rst precepts of law must pertain to justice—which renders each his 
own. Aquinas frequently provides arguments85 that only cohere if the 
two meanings of debitum (debt and duty) are not distinct meanings but 
mutually implicative, such that debitum can be used interchangeably to 
indicate owing (as a debt) and ought (as a duty) without equivocation. 
Aquinas uses this rich notion of debitum to move immediately from what 
is owed to someone to what is a moral duty enjoined by law. For example, 
“the precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as @rst principles, 
which need to be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts 
of the decalogue had to be chieKy about those acts of justice in which the 
notion of duty [debiti] is manifest.”86 +e notion of debitum as due treated 
84   To any who might object to the inclusion of ceteris paribus, I would note that the 
whole point of this article (ST I-II, q. 94, a. 4) is precisely to point out that such 
ceteris paribus clauses attach to all but to most general moral norms. 
85   ST I-II, q. 100, a. 3, ad 3; q. 100, a. 5, ad 1; II-II, q. 140, a. 1, ad 3; q. 56, a. 2, corp.; 
II-II, q. 122, a. 1, corp. See also the following notes.
86   ST II-II, q. 140, a. 1, ad 3.
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by justice is identical to the notion of debitum as duty expressed by law. 
Again, “justice, more than any other virtue, regards its object under the 
aspect of something due [rationem debiti], which is a necessary condition 
for a precept.”87 +e notion of “due” that justice treats is the same “due” 
that is essential to the ratio of precept (i.e., duty or obligation). And again, 
he writes: “Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty [ratio-
nem debiti]. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far 
as they belong to justice”88
+us I believe Finnis touches but dismisses the solution to the is–ought 
problem in his treatment of Hugo Grotius: “Translators of [Grotius] . . 
. o7en render debiti as ‘obligatory.’ But this fails to preserve the delicate 
ambiguity in the thought of Grotius and his sources.”89 As I have pointed 
out, this equation of “due” and “duty” is not an ambiguity (at least, not 
in Aquinas); rather, the equivalence of the “two” meanings of debitum is 
crucial to his theory of law.
Finnis continues: “Granted that we can discern right and wrong, due 
and undue, by reasoning, what makes it obligatory to choose the right and 
due and to avoid the wrong and undue?” I answer: simply that one who 
fails to see that he (morally) ought to render what he owes to another has 
not actually understood what it is to owe something to someone. Owing 
something to another is, for Aquinas, precisely what it is to be obligated. 
Once I have judged that I really do owe something to someone, then it 
becomes unreasonable, “repugnant to right reason,”90 for me to choose to 
withhold what I owe. To be categorically demanded by reason is all it is for 
a thing to be obligatory, and to be an absolute condition of acting in accord 
with right reason is all that is required to impose the hypothetical necessity 
proper to obligation on the will. +at English has severed the etymological 
connections between “owes” and “ought” and between “due” and “duty” is, 
from Aquinas’s perspective, an unfortunate corruption.
And we can go a step further. If obligation is entailed by such bridge 
concepts, factual descriptors of relations that entail owing, then we can 
87  ST II-II, q. 56, a. 1, ad 1; cf. a. 2, corp.
88   ST I-II, q. 99, a. 5, ad 1. +is must be read in the context of the corpus, where 
Aquinas writes, “+e things that have to be done do not come under the precept 
except in so far as they have the character of a duty [debiti rationem]”). One may 
wonder how this claim—that the notion of due is essential to law and obligation—
is to be reconciled with the earlier example of vowing. In answer, note that a vow is 
always made to someone, such that to vow is to place oneself in a relation of owing 
something to another. 
89   Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 44.
90   ST I-II, q. 18, a. 5, ad 4; aa. 8–10.
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see why Aquinas seems to identify synderesis, whereby we apprehend @rst 
moral principles (speci@cally, @rst moral norms), with the speculative habit 
of understanding. I see no reason to think that understanding the very 
notion of vowing or the very concept of ownership, or even the notion of 
owing, is not a task of the speculative intellect.
Indeed, Aquinas holds that not only speculative principles but also 
practical (and evidently moral) principles, such as “one should do evil to 
no man,” belong to the “understanding which is an intellectual virtue.”91 
And in a parallel passage, he says that man takes the universal principles of 
action from “the understanding of principles, whereby he understands that 
he should do no evil.”92 (Again, the habit of understanding is a habit of the 
speculative intellect.)93 Similarly, he justi@es calling conscience “the law 
of understanding” by appeal to its relation to synderesis,94 and he says the 
judgment of conscience consists in pura cognitione and that it is made by 
speculando per principia.95 And of the supernatural gi7 of understanding 
(which perfects the natural, speculative habit of understanding), he says, 
“the gi7 of understanding extends also to certain actions, not as though 
these were its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our actions is 
the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which is perfected by the 
gi7 of understanding, adheres by contemplating and consulting it.”96 In 
short, I believe that synderesis and understanding are, if not strictly the 
same habit, at least distinguished by an all but inconsequential di=erence. 
+at is, it seems to me that understanding takes on the label “synderesis” 
and becomes “practical” when it considers notions (like owing, debitum, 
justice, owning, or vowing) that immediately bear implications about what 
is reasonable or unreasonable action.97 It is through the understanding of 
such concepts that synderesis discovers moral law.
I am free to suggest that “ought” arises in the speculative intellect in 
this way because I have maintained the distinction between “ought” and 
“wants.” If we expect obligation, of itself, to move the will, then one cannot 
root our apprehension of obligation in speculative knowledge. As we noted 
at the outset, speculative knowledge alone does not give rise to value and 
cannot move one to act; but if obligation and value are distinct, the fact–
91   ST II-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 1. 
92   ST I-II, q. 58, a. 5, corp.
93   See ST I-II, q. 57, a. 2, and In VI eth., lec. 5, no. 4.
94   De veritate, q. 17, a. 2, ad 4.
95   De veritate, q. 17, a. 1, ad 4.
96   ST II-II, q. 8, a. 3; see also a. 6.
97   See for example, Yves Simon, A Critique of Moral Knowledge, trans. Ralph McIn-
erny (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 5–7. 
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value gap poses no problem to deriving obligations. An obligation provides 
the intellect with a reason to perform some act, but it does not necessarily 
and immediately move the will. Whether I owe something to another and 
whether it is good for me to give it to him are two di=erent questions. 
Determining that it would be unreasonable of me not to do something is 
not precisely the same as recognizing that doing that thing satis@es some 
appetite that I experience. +at I am conscious of having made a vow does 
not imply that I want to keep it or that I somehow see that it is advanta-
geous to keep it or that I understand that it is perfective of me to keep it. 
What it does imply is that it would be, ceteris paribus, positively unreason-
able of me to refuse to ful@ll it, and that is all that is needed for me to @nd 
myself obliged to ful@ll it.
Nonetheless, doing what is reasonable always does answer to one of our 
natural inclinations. Speculative knowledge can move us to act, because 
humans do, by nature, experience a desire to live according to reason: 
“Since the rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a 
natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act according 
to virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed 
by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act 
virtuously.”98 Man, as rational, has a natural inclination to act according 
to reason, and that is nothing else than to act according to virtue. So 
ful@lling obligation will always answer to at least one experienced desire, 
a preeminent desire that should, but does not necessarily, trump other 
desires. But again, the order is crucial: I @rst apprehend what is obligatory 
as obligatory, and, in light of that apprehension, I then also apprehend 
it as desirable. Indeed, it is only because I have already judged that it is 
absolutely to be done that I can subsequently grasp that it is of itself always 
good for me in being uniquely reasonable.
Because our apprehension of obligation as such does not directly 
include the notion of what is perfective of us, this account does not jeopar-
dize the universality of the natural law.99 +e sort of speculative knowledge 
wherein I root the apprehension of obligation is quite plausibly universal—
the concept of, for example, ownership is quite common. No knowledge of 
philosophical anthropology—let alone of natural theology—is required.100 
98   ST I-II, q. 94, a. 3, corp.
99   See for example, Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 48 and 77, where he 
sketches the problem.
100   I @nd myself in agreement with both Veatch (“Natural Law,” 258) and Finnis 
(“Natural Law and the ‘Is’–‘Ought’ Question: An Invitation to Professor Veatch,” 
Catholic Lawyer 26 [1981]: 266–77, at 270). Veatch observes: “It is no less impos-
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+ere is, then, no danger that only philosophers can have accurate knowl-
edge of the @rst precepts of the natural law.
What of the logical problem that nothing can be in the conclusion that 
was not in its premises? +is is not violated by what I am suggesting. +e 
logical autonomy of ethics is maintained, because any syllogistic reasoning 
about what is right and obligatory starts with per se nota propositions that 
already include moral predicates. What is shared between the speculative 
and practical intellects in discovering obligations is only an apprehension 
of a concept or ratio, like the concept of vowing or the concept of property. 
It is prior to any syllogism—indeed, prior to any proposition—so the logi-
cal rules about what sort of conclusions can be drawn from which sorts of 
premises do not yet apply. In the @rst place we grasp general notions (like 
ownership or vowing), which, in turn, imply general, per se nota norms that 
can be viewed as conditional in structure, such as that, if someone owns 
something, then (all else being equal) I ought not interfere with his use 
of it; said otherwise, I owe it to him not to deprive him of that property. 
Such a norm is a bridge principle: the protasis (that someone owns some-
thing) is a question of fact, while the apostasis (that I ought not interfere 
with his use of it) is normative.101 +en, conscience can judge whether the 
descriptive protasis of this general norm is, as a matter of fact, ful@lled in 
this or that case and draw a normative conclusion: this person does own 
this thing, therefore I ought not deprive him of its use.102
sible to determine, or even to adequately state what a human being is without 
making reference to what he ought to be or to that natural end, ful@llment or 
good, which it is incumbent upon any human being, by nature, to try to be or 
become,” although as Finnis presses, “does not his view that a full knowledge of 
human nature involves a knowledge of what is ‘incumbent upon’ human beings 
suggest that, epistemologically, a knowledge of what is good for human beings, 
and thus incumbent upon them, is a condition precedent to any full knowledge 
of human nature[?]” Moral experience (including experience of obligation) is an 
important datum that precedes any adequate anthropology, not vice versa, in the 
same way that moral experience must be a given that is better known to us that 
God’s existence, if a moral proof of God is to be intelligible. 
101   +is conditional structure is important. I can apprehend the norm prior to know-
ing the particular cases in which it applies or even whether there are any such cases. 
+us, an agnostic or even an atheist can know the general moral norm that if there 
is a personal God of the sort that classical theists confess, then he owes obedience 
to that God. 
102   We ought, I think, distinguish two similar but distinct rational processes that we 
might be tempted to call “conscience.” One—which I identify with conscience 
properly so-called—applies the universal norms of synderesis here and now, deter-
mining that this act is or is not reasonable and must or must not be done. +e 
other—which I reckon a work of prudence—takes the cultivation of virtue as an 
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 +e logical law is preserved because, by the time we begin syllogistic 
reasoning, we already have an “ought” (or at least something that strictly 
implies an “ought”) in the predicate. +e transition from speculative to 
practical is prior to any proposition, so we are not moving from “is” to 
“ought.” Rather, we are moving from a speculative apprehension of an 
abstract concept (like ownership or vowing) to a per se nota principle that 
has a descriptive subject and a predicate that stipulates conditions for ratio-
nal behavior (or if we maintain its conditional structure, a factual protasis 
and a normative apodosis). It is those per se nota bridge principles that, in 
turn, allow us, in an incontrovertibly valid deduction, to derive an obliga-
tion from a judgment of fact. +us I am not denying the logical autonomy 
of ethics; I deny only the semantic autonomy of ethics.103
What of Aquinas’s repeated insistence that the will, as free, can only 
be subject to conditional or hypothetical necessity imposed by the desire 
for some end? +is is not violated on my suggestion: what is right is by 
that fact categorically to be done in the judgment of the intellect, but the 
necessity that binds the will is only hypothetical: one must will to do what 
reason judges right only insofar as one desires to live according to reason. 
+e will is not under an absolute necessity to obey conscience, because 
the natural desire to live according to reason is only one of many natural 
desires. As Aquinas notes, virtue is natural to us insofar as we have a natu-
ral desire to live reasonably, but we do not have a natural inclination to 
each act of virtue considered in its species.104
In sum, I suggest that we @rst apprehend (through the speculative habit 
of understanding) certain general notions that entail a relationship of 
owing something to someone. From such notions, we immediately grasp 
the truth of certain general, per se nota, moral norms (this step seems to 
me what Aquinas calls “synderesis,” and this is the beginning of practical 
reason insofar as it guides appetite). We can then take account of various 
facts, determining that this norm applies here and now; that is, we judge 
that we are, in fact, in such a relationship that involves owing something 
to someone (this is the work of conscience), and therefore we can recognize 
end intended by the agent and then determines how best to attain and guard that 
virtue. +at the two are at least theoretically distinct can be seen in the kinds of 
judgments they reach: the @rst will reach absolute (categorical) judgments of what 
must or must not to be done, while the latter will make prudential (hypothetical) 
judgments which will o7en be counsels about how best and most surely to nurture 
virtue; see, e.g., ST I-II, q. 107, a. 2, and II-II, q. 184, a. 3. 
103   For more on the distinction of the claims of logical and semantic autonomy, see 
Pigden, “Hume on Is and Ought.”
104   ST I-II, q. 94, a. 3, corp.
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that it would be unreasonable of us not to render what it owed. In other 
words, conscience judges that we ought to give it to him, that we are bound 
by reason to give it to him. Whatever reason determines is, without qual-
i@cation, to be done is then also perceived as good for the agent insofar 
as we have a natural inclination to live according to reason; what reason 
determines is categorically to be done necessarily corresponds to an expe-
rienced desire. +is natural inclination to live according to reason makes 
it possible for us to will to do something for no other reason than that we 
believe it is right or reasonable. +us, the will can will either to obey reason 
(following the judgment of conscience) or to follow one of our other natu-
ral inclinations in de@ance of reason (which would constitute formal sin 
and introduce guilt).105 Once the will has willed either to follow or to defy 
reason, practical reason can arrange the means to the end willed (this is the 
work of prudence, the practical intellect that follows appetite for the end).
Hence Aquinas explains that prudence is ruled by a prior understand-
ing of what is just and lawful,106 of what we owe to another. But prudence, 
which takes its principles from the appetites, can only be ruled in this way 
through that appetitive power which is the will. Our understanding of 
what is just (grasped by synderesis) guides prudence through the media-
tion of the rational appetite, which is the seat of the virtue of justice and 
which is responsive to reason’s apprehension of what is due to another.107 
Sin is thus, at root, the willful and sel@sh refusal to render the other what 
reason has judged is simply owed to the other, hence Aquinas’s saying that 
legal justice is a general virtue and injustice is a general vice, in conformity 
with 1 John 3:4, “all sin is iniquity.”108
Of course, this process may fold over on itself so that these two func-
tions of practical reason regularly end up more tightly intertwined in real-
ity than my neat distinction might at @rst suggest. In actual deliberation, 
there is a constant interplay between the reason and will: the means we 
choose in order to obtain one end can themselves be taken as a more proxi-
mate end that we in turn deliberate about attaining. Further, the two func-
tions of practical reason tend to overlap: at each step of arranging means to 
ends, conscience of moral norms can inKuence our prudential judgments 
because prudence can realize that some possible means of attaining one 
particular end would frustrate us by interfering with our attainment of 
105   Described in De veritate, q. 17, a. 1, ad 4.
106   ST II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2.
107   ST II-II, q. 58, a. 4, corp.
108   ST II-II, q. 58, a. 5, ad 3. Bear in mind that iniquitas is from in aequus, meaning 
literally, injustice or inequality.
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some other end that we also desire.109
Whether I am right to place our recognition of moral norms in the 
speculative apprehension of concepts that entail relations of owing is, 
however, not the principal point.110 What is essential to this discussion is 
that obligation and value are discrete concepts and that, in Aquinas’s moral 
psychology, they are treated by di=erent functions of practical reason: the 
practical reason that leads the appetite for the end (by appointing the end) 
and the practical reason that follows the appetite for the end (by arranging 
the means to the end). For this reason, obligation may be categorical to the 
intellect while being only hypothetical to the will. +e fact of sin requires 
that value and obligation be distinct; it requires that what is decisive to 
the intellect not necessarily be decisive to the will.111 So long as we fail to 
distinguish obligation from value, so long as we fail to distinguish moral 
“ought” as perceived by the intellect from good as desired by the will, we 
will continue to face an insoluble problem.112
109   +is alertness to various ends is diligence or solicitude, opposed by negligence; see 
ST II-II, q. 54, and q. 47, a. 9. Prudence takes account of the particular, but it is not 
myopic: it can attend to a number of disparate, desired goods even as it arranges 
the means to one particular good. I am hardly prudent if in my pursuit of one good 
I inadvertently destroy another that I hold dear.
110   +e tentative nature of my account of synderesis’s derivation of obligation from 
speculative understanding deserves to be stressed. I am suggesting a radical shi7 in 
our understanding of practical reason; many considerations have yet to be made, 
and much work—both textual and philosophical—remains to be done before we 
will be warranted in proposing detailed accounts with con@dence. +is must be 
le7 to a future work. 
111   De veritate, q. 17, a. 1, ad 4.
112   I o=er my thanks to R. J. Matava for his patient engagement with me on this project.
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